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INTEREST ANALYSIS AND DIVORCE ACTIONS
DAVID E. SEIDELSON*
Q NE of the most dramatic changes in conflicts law' in the past
decade has been the shift away from the mechanical appli-
cation of rigid indicative laws2 used to resolve choice-of-law prob-
lems toward an interest analysis method of fashioning indicative
laws to resolve such problems.3 Less dramatic, perhaps because
it has evolved over a greater period of time, has been the continu-
ing enlargement of the jurisdiction made available to courts over
nonresident defendants.4 Both of these developments uniquely
coincide in various aspects of divorce litigation and raise these
questions: To what extent may a court assert jurisdiction to hear
and determine a divorce action? To what extent may a court as-
sert jurisdiction to hear and determine the issue of permanent ali-
mony incident to a divorce action? To what body of dispositive
Professor of Law, George Washington University. B.A., University of Pittsburgh,
1951; LL.B., 1956.
1. The author subscribes to the view of Professor Leflar that the "mild break with
the past" manifested by using "the vernacular 'Conflicts'" instead of "the traditional term
Conflict of Laws" is consistent with "a recognition that the law requires both new language
and new analysis if it is to be described, or explained, in realistic fashion." R. LEnAR,
AMrMUCAN CONFLiaCrs LAw v (1968).
2. The phrase indicative law is intended to refer to "those rules which indicate the
system of dispositive rules which is to be applied." Taintbr, Foreign Judgment in Rem:
Full Faith and Credit v. Res Judicata in Personam, 8 U. Prrr. L. REV. 223, 233 n.58
(1942). It is the author's belief that indicative law is simpler and no less descriptive
than such phrases as "conflict-of-laws laws" or "conflict-of-laws rules." When a court
utilizing interest analysis finds itself confronted with a choice-of-law problem wherein
State A and State B, as the "competing" states, both have legitimate interests in the par-
ticular issue, it is the indicative law fashioned by the forum which will indicate whether
State A's local law or State B's local law will be applied to resolve the issue.
3. See, e.g., Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970) (and Symposium
on Cipolla v. Shaposka-An Application of "Interest Analysis," 9 DUQUESNE L. Rv. 347
(1971)); Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 894, 301 N.YS.2d 519 (1969);
Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d. 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967) (and Comments
on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 552 (1968)); Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d
259 (Ky. 1967); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966) (Clark's use of
the "better rule of law" is discussed in Seidelson, Comment on Cipolla v. Shaposka,
9 DUQUESNE L. Rav. 423, 428 (1971)); Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 30, 216 A.2d 781
(1966); Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966);
Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963) (Thompson and Clark and
their chronological significance are discussed in Seidelson, The Americanization of Renvoi,
7 DUQUESNE L. Rv. 201, 217 (1969)) ; Marra v. Bushee, 317 F. Supp. 972 (D. Vt. 1970).
4. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) ; McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 US. 310
(1945); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Good-
man, 294 U.S. 623 (1935); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
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law5 should a court refer in determining the grounds available for
divorce? And, finally, to what body of dispositive law should a
court refer in determining the propriety and amount of perma-
nent alimony?
Conventional wisdom and a line of judicial decisions indicate
that the basic jurisdictional requirement in a divorce action is
domicile. Minimally, plaintiff's domicile in the forum state is ade-
quate to give the court jurisdiction to hear and determine the
divorce action, provided that the nonresident defendant is given a
form of constructive service reasonably calculated to provide actual
notice of the action and an opportunity to defend.7 Absent an
appearance by such a nonresident defendant, however, the forum
is precluded from making a determination of permanent alimony
which will be binding on the defendant.8 When analyzed, each of
those jurisdictional conclusions can be seen as the product of in-
terest analysis, even though the conclusions were achieved long
before the dramatic shift to interest analysis in resolving choice-
of-law problems occurred, and even before "interest analysis" came
to be a recognized term of legal art.
Domicile became the sine qua non of divorce jurisdiction be-
cause of judicial recognition of the legitimate interest which
each state has in the marital status of its domiciliaries. Plaintiff's
domicile in the forum state was recognized as sufficient to provide
the forum with jurisdiction to hear and determine a divorce action
there instituted for the same reason: the forum's legitimate inter-
est in the marital status of its plaintiff domiciliary. The conclusion
5. The phrase dispositive law is intended to refer to "those rules of law which are
used to determine the nature of rights arising from a fact-group, i.e., those which dispose
of a claim." Taintor, supra note 2, at 233 n.58. It is the author's view that dispositive
law is more descriptive and useful than such phrases as "municipal law" or "internal law."
The author is indebted to the late Charles W. Taintor II for creation of the phrases
indicative law and dispositive law. When a court utilizing interest analysis resolves a choice-
of-law problem wherein State A and State B, as the "competing" states, both have
legitimate interests in the particular issue, by determining that State A's interests are su-
perior, the forum will resolve or dispose of the issue by the application of State A's
dispositive law.
6. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); William v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226
(1945) [hereinafter referred to as Williams II]; Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287
(1942) [hereinafter referred to as Williams I]; Jennings v. Jennings, 251 Ala. 73, 36 So.
2d 236 (1948); Voss v. Voss, 5 N.J. 402, 75 A.2d 889 (1950). But see Wood v. Wood,
159 Tex. 350, 320 S.W.2d 807 (1959), where a residence imposed by military orders was
deemed an adequate substitute for domicile.
7. See cases cited in supra note 6.
8. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
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was often stated in terms of a quasi in rem jurisdiction. 9 Analo-
gizing the marital status with a res, courts stated that plaintiff's
domicile in the forum state at the time of instituting the divorce
action had the effect of placing the marital status (res) before the
court, thus authorizing the court to assert (in rem) jurisdiction
over the status. That jurisdiction permitted the court to operate
upon or terminate the marital status of the plaintiff. Since a neces-
sary concomitant of such termination was termination of the mari-
tal status of the defendant, that jurisdiction was found to exist, so
long as defendant was given a constitutionally appropriate mode
of constructive service. An unfortunate consequence of the analogy
between the marital status and a res was the concept of "divisible
divorce.""' A court acknowledged to have jurisdiction to terminate
the marital status because of plaintiff's domicile in the forum plus
constructive service on the nonresident defendant, was deemed to
lack jurisdiction to enter an alimony order which would be bind-
ing upon such defendant." The reason? The court's jurisdiction
was limited to the res before it (the marital status) and could
not be enlarged to an in personam jurisdiction over the nonresi-
dent defendant given only constructive service. The in rem juris-
diction would not justify binding the defendant "personally." The
unstated premise was that termination of the marriage by a divorce
decree did not improperly affect the defendant "personally." As a
result, the forum at plaintiff's domicile could enter a divorce decree
entitled to full faith and credit 2 in every sister state (including
the domicile of defendant) but its alimony order was not binding
upon the defendant in any sister state, unless the nonresident had
entered an appearance in the divorce action.
In addition there remained the question of the validity of
the forum's determination that plaintiff was domiciled in the
forum state. Absent either domestic personal service on, or the
entry of an appearance by, the nonresident defendant, the forum's
conclusion that plaintiff was domiciled in the forum state at the
time the action was initiated was subject to collateral attack by
9. See cases cited in supra note 6.
10. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 424 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
11. See cases cited in supra note 8.
12. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Coe v. Coe, 334! U.S. 378 (1948).
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the defendant in the courts of sister states.13 Consequently, even
the forum's divorce decree was a less than certain conclusion that
the marriage had been terminated.
Both of those legal doctrines-"divisible divorce" and col-
lateral attack upon the forum's determination of domicile-can
be characterized as conclusions resting upon an early form of in-
terest analysis. If Nevada could not bind a New York wife by a
Nevada alimony decree, it was probably because of New York's
legitimate interest in the economic integrity of its domiciliary' 4
And if a North Carolina court was free to make independent in-
quiry into a Nevada determination of domicile, it was probably be-
cause of North Carolina's interest in the marital status of its
domiciliary. 5
It would appear then that much of the existing law staking
out the perimeters of the jurisdiction available to a court to enter
a divorce decree or an alimony order or both is explicable in terms
of an early and not unexpectedly primitive form of interest
analysis. What remains to be determined is whether or not, and
if so to what extent, a more refined application of interest analysis,
complemented by an expanding view of jurisdiction generally,
can be utilized to achieve a more reasoned and palatable determin-
ation of such available jurisdiction. At least two aspects of the
existing state of the law appear unsatisfactory: (1) a court may
be deemed to have appropriate jurisdiction over the marital status,
yet be found without jurisdiction over one incident of that status,
alimony, and (2) a court's determination of domicile, as a con-
dition precedent to finding jurisdiction over the marital status,
is subject to redetermination by other courts. Consequently,
neither the alimony order nor the basic divorce decree is assured
of receiving full faith and credit if the nonresident defendant
simply ignores the divorce proceedings.
13. Williams I, 317 U.S. at 291. It has long been the author's view that re-examina-
tion of Nevada's determination of domicile in the Williams cases would have been appro-
priate even if the divorce-action defendants had appeared in the Nevada divorce suits,
since North Carolina had an independent sovereign right to determine if a crime (biga-
mous cohabitation) had been committed within its borders. Seidelson, The Full Faith
and Credit Clause: An Instrument for Resolution of Intranational Conflicts Problems, 32
GEO. WASH. L. RaV. 554, 571-76 (1964). For a more restrictive view of North Carolina's
interest in the cases, see Corwin, Out-Haddocking Haddock, 93 U. PA. L. Rav. 341 (1945).
14. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 547
(1948).
15. Williams II, 325 U.S. at 232.
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Even the most sophisticated application of interest analysis
could be expected to lead to the conclusion that a court in the
state of plaintiff's domicile should have jurisdiction over the mari-
tal status, and therefore, over the divorce action instituted to ter-
minate that status. Moreover, interest analysis would suggest that
that forum has a legitimate interest in the question of alimony,
since that issue bears the very real potential of affecting the eco-
nomic integrity of the forum's domiciliary, whether payer or recip-
ient. That interest would appear to be sufficient to justify, in a
constitutional sense, application of the forum's dispositive law 6 in
determining the issue of alimony; therefore-and probably a
fortiori-that interest should be deemed sufficient to justify the
forum's assertion of jurisdiction over the issue. While there are
some who believe that the interests sufficient to justify an assertion
of jurisdiction should be greater than those required to justify
imposition of the forum's dispositive lawir and some who appar-
ently believe that approximately equal interests would justify
either,'8 it is the author's belief that the interests required to sup-
port an asserted jurisdiction need not be as great as those required
to impose the forum's dispositive law. The assertion of juris-
diction merely provides a forum having the capacity to hear and
determine the case. It has relatively little direct effect in deter-
mining how the case or any issues therein may be decided, and,
to the extent that such an effect exists, it must be justified by
appropriate contacts convertible into legitimate interests.'9 The
16. That such a choice-of-law resolution would be constitutionally acceptable does not
mean it would be the best resolution possible. See text at note 53 infra.
17. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 US. 235, 253 (1958) (Warren, CJ.):
For the purpose of applying its rule that the validity of a trust is determined
by the law of the State of its creation, Florida ruled that the appointment amounted
to a "republication" of the original trust instrument in Florida. For choice-of-law
purposes such a ruling may be justified, but we think it an insubstantial connection
with the trust agreement for purposes of determining the question of personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.
18. Id. at 258 (Black, J., dissenting):
In my view it could hardly be denied that Florida had sufficient interest so that
a court with jurisdiction might properly apply Florida law, if it chose, to deter-
mine whether the appointment was effectual. . . . True, the question whether the
law of a State can be applied to a transaction is different from the question whether
the courts of that State have jurisdiction to enter a judgment, but the two are
often closely related and to a substantial degree depend upon similar considerations.
19. For an examination of the "conversion" process, compare Pearson v. Northeast
Airlines, Inc., 309 F-2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963) with Kilberg
v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961). The
conversion of "contacts" into legitimate interests in the two cases is discussed in Seidelson,
supra note 13, at 567.
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imposition of a state's dispositive law, on the other hand, neces-
sarily will affect-in fact, determine-how the issues are to be
decided. By definition, dispositive law is that law applied to dispose
of or resolve a given issue. Therefore, if the forum as plaintiff's
domicile has an interest in the issue of alimony sufficient to justify
the imposition of its own dispositive law in resolving that issue,
it should be deemed to have an interest adequate to justify asserting
jurisdiction over the issue.
That same conclusion could be achieved in a number of other
ways through a number of different approaches. The simulta-
neously determinative and enigmatic phrase created by the Su-
preme Court for testing the constitutional propriety of an assertion
of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is "minimum con-
tacts."20 In International Shoe,2 the Court said that "due process
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum,
he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the mainte-
nance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.'"2 When applied to a divorce action, the
magic phrase could be so construed that the presence of the
marital status within the forum state (by virtue of plaintiff's
domicile there) constitutes a minimum contact between the other
party to that status (nonresident defendant) and the forum state.
If that construction is acceptable, the Court's classic test of in
personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is satisfied.
Hanson v. Denckla" utilized the phrase "minimal contacts," but
added its own fillip to the meaning of the phrase:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship
with a nonresident defendant can not satisfy the requirement
of contact with the forum State. The application of that rule
will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant's activity,
but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conduct-
ing activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws.24
20. International Shoe Co. v. State of'IVashington, 326 US. 810, 816 (1945).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 857 U.S. 285 (1958).
24. Id. at 253.
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That quoted language makes it more difficult to sustain the con-
clusion that a divorce-action plaintiff's domicile in the forum state
provides a constitutionally permissible basis for the assertion of
personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. Plaintiff's
acquisition of domicile within the forum could be characterized
as the kind of "unilateral activity" inadequate to satisfy the re-
quirement of minimum contacts between forum and nonresident
defendant. Finding "some act by which the defendant purpose-
fully . . . invok[es] the benefits and protections of [the forum's]
laws" is an admittedly difficult chore with regard to the nonresi-
dent defendant in a divorce action. Difficult, but not impossible,
especially for one determined to justify such jurisdiction.
It could be asserted that every party to a marriage enters that
relationship with knowledge, actual or legally presumed, that each
party to the marriage possesses the capacity to establish a separate
domicile, therefore with the legal capacity to place before a court
in the domicile state the marital status. Moreover, each party to
the marriage (even a marriage threatened with an imminent
divorce action) could have imposed upon him the legal presump-
tion that he wished his spouse to be the beneficiary of the "benefits
and protections" of the laws of any state where the spouse estab-
lished domicile. An amalgam of those two conclusions or legal pre-
sumptions could support the determination that any one who
enters into marriage contemplates that his spouse will enjoy the
benefits and protections of the laws of the state where the spouse
establishes a domicile, and therefore purposefully avails himself
of the beneficence of those laws.
To the reader not wholly satisfied with that ratio decidendi,
and troubled about the conclusion that the nonresident defendant
in a divorce action has purposefully availed himself of the benefits
of the laws of the state in which the plaintiff has established domi-
cile, the author expresses sympathetic understanding. To the
reader who doubts that such a defendant has even minimum con-
tacts with the forum state, the author expresses similar consolation.
In addition, to those readers the author wishes to offer an inde-
pendent justification for such jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant in a divorce action.
Analogizing the marital status with a res for purposes of deter-
mining jurisdiction necessarily resulted in imposing upon divorce
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actions the limitations manifested in Pennoyer v. Neff,26 Harris V.
Balk26 and, more recently, Seider v. Roth. Those limitations,
given constitutional sanction in Pennoyer, were the sequelae of
concepts rooted in independent sovereignty and initiation of ac-
tions by the capias ad respondendum.2 8 Even as early as the deci-
sion in Pennoyer those concepts had become anachronistic. The
states of the United States had not retained all of those aspects of
independent sovereignty usually associated with independent na-
tions.29 And the capias ad respondendum had long before Pen-
noyer ceased being the usual mode of instituting civil actions, here
and in Englandf 0 Yet, Pennoyer, by sublimating those jurisdic-
tional limitations into due process proscriptions, gave to them a
degree of permanence undeserved by contemporary facts or ra-
tional analysis. Happily, subsequent decisions have loosened the
rigid strictures of Pennoyer in many areas where practical necessity
and reasoned consideration have joined to compel a broader juris-
diction over nonresident defendants. The automobile,81 securities
sales,22 insurance contracts33 and a general recognition of the con-
tribution made by each state to the general state of the union"'
have resulted in an enlarging jurisdictional basis available to the
courts of the several states. In appropriate situations that jurisdic-
tion has been found to exist even over nonresident defendants who
had been afforded only a form of constructive service reasonably
25. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
26. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
27. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.26 99 (1966); see Seidelson, Seider v.
Roth, et seq.: The Urge Toward Reason and the Irrational Ratio Decidendi, 39 GEo. WAShl.
L. Rr-v. 42 (1970). The limitations imposed in Pennoyer, Harris and Seider went to the
extent of the jurisdiction available to the state courts involved in the cases. Specifically, the
jurisdiction was limited to the res attached in each case: in Pennoyer, the land attached
in Oregon; in Harris, the obligation attached in Maryland; and in Seider, the dual
obligations to defend and indemnify attached in New York. Thus, although in each case
the cause of action asserted was unrelated to the res attached, the effective relief which
each court could accord the plaintiff was limited to the dollar value of the attached res.
28. A writ
which commands the sheriff to take the defendant, and him safely keep, so that he
may have his body before the court on a certain day, to answer the plaintiff in
the action .... It notifies defendant to defend suit and procures his arrest until
security for plaintiff's claim is furnished.
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 262 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
29. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,722 (1877) ; Seidelson, supra note 27, at 49.
30. Levy, Mesne Process in Personal Actions at Common Law and the Power Doc-
trine, 78 YAL L.J. 52, 68, 69, 98 (1968).
31. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
32. Henry L. Doherty 8- Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
33. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
34. Williams v. Connolly, 227 F. Supp. 539, 546 (D. Minn. 1964).
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calculated to provide actual notice of the proceedings and an op-
portunity to defend. Surely divorce actions, involving the marital
status of the litigants, and alimony orders in such actions, involving
the economic integrity of the litigants, present a most appealing
area for a jurisdictional basis adequate to provide certainty to the
determination of the status and interstate recognition of the eco-
nomic consequences of such determination. Practical necessity and
reasoned consideration clamor for judicial recognition of a juris-
diction adequate to accomplish those objectives.
A further consideration suggesting the propriety of that ade-
quate jurisdiction is a factual and legal distinction between an
alimony decree entered in a divorce action and the kind of in rem
jurisdiction considered by the Court in Pennoyer. In Pennoyer,
the original cause of action asserted-recovery of an attorney's fee30
-was wholly unrelated to the res attached, the Oregon land. Had
the cause of action been related to the land, there is at least some
question as to whether the Court's restricted view of jurisdiction
would have been the same. For example, Pennsylvania has had for
a number of years a statute37 which imposes in personam juris-
diction over nonresident owners of Pennsylvania land as to causes
of action arising out of that ownership. Thus, if one is injured
on the land in Pennsylvania, allegedly as a result of some dan-
gerous condition on the land, the injured party may initiate the
action in a Pennsylvania court and that forum will be deemed to
have in personam jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant, sub-
ject to utilization of an appropriate form of constructive service.38
That in personam jurisdiction will enable the court to hear and
determine the totality of the plaintiff's claim and to enter a judg-
ment for plaintiff even in an amount in excess of the value of the
land in Pennsylvania. Such a judgment, having an appropriate in
personam jurisdictional basis, would be entitled to full faith and
credit in the courts of all sister states.
Harris v. Balk, like Pennoyer, involved a res having no inti-
mate relationship with the plaintiff's cause of action. The debt for
which Epstein sued Balk was wholly unrelated to the debt owing
35. See cases cited in supra notes 31-33.
36. 95 U.S. at 719.
37. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 331 (1937).
38. Rumig v. Ripley Mfg., Corp., 366 Pa. 343, 77 A.2d 360 (1951); Dubin V. City
of Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. 9, C. 61 (1938).
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from Harris to Balk and attached by serving Harris in Maryland.30
In Seider v. Roth, the dual obligations to defend and indemnify
owing from the liability carrier to its nonresident insured, and
providing the res, 40 were not inherently a part of the plaintiff's
cause of action against the defendant-insured. It is true, of course,
that in both Harris and Seider the res attached determined the dol-
lar value of the effective relief which the forum could provide the
plaintiff; but in neither case was the res an incident of the plain-
tiff's cause of action against the nonresident defendant.
In divorce actions, the court's determination of alimony is a
determination of an economic aspect intimately related to and an
incident of the marital status before the court. The issue of alimony
is innerently before the court once the marital status is brought
before the court. The division between res attached and cause of
action asserted in Pennoyer, Harris and Seider is simply not
feasible in a divorce action in which the issue of alimony is pre-
sented. The "res" which brings the cause before the court, the
marital status, envelops the issue of alimony. To find appropriate
jurisdiction over the former but not over the latter is incongruous.
It is also the cause of the undesirable consequence of "divisible
divorce." If a jurisdictional basis capable of eliminating that un-
wanted consequence, and, coincidentally, calculated to preclude
relitigation of the forum's determination of plaintiff's domicile,
thus providing certainty to the marital status, can be achieved, its
99. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 216 (1905). The plaintiff Epstein, a resident of Mary-
land, sued defendant Balk, a resident of North Carolina, in a Maryland court seeking to
recover $344, allegedly owned by Balk to Epstein. The action was instituted by a writ
of foreign attachment, with Harris, a North Carolina resident temporarily in Maryland,
being served as garnishnee. The "property" of Balk in Harris' possession was an obligation
of $180 owed by Harris to Balk. Harris admitted the obligation to Balk and, pursuant
to a Maryland court order, paid the $180 to Epstein. Subsequently, Balk sued Harris in
North Carolina, seeking to recover the $180 Harris had owed Balk. The Supreme Court
of the United States determined that, since Maryland had acquired jurisdiction over that
$180 obligation, the Maryland court order directing Harris to pay the $180 to Epstein had
an appropriate jurisdictional basis and therefore was entitled to full faith and credit ill
North Carolina. Consequently, Balk could not recover the $180 from Harris.
40. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d at 113, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101
(1966). The plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Seider, residents of New York, brought a personal
injury action against defendant Lemiux, a resident of Quebec, in a New York court. The
action arose out of a three-car collision which occurred in Vermont The New York action
was instituted by a writ of foreign attachment, with Hartford Accident and Indemnity Com-
pany, Lemiux's liability insurance carrier, being served as garnishee. The "property" of
Lemiux in Hartford's possession consisted of the dual obligations owed by the insurer to its
insured to defend and indemnify. The New York Court of Appeals determined that the pro-
ceedings had given the New York court jurisdiction to the extent of the dollar limits of
Lemiux's liability insurance with Hartford.
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accomplishment should be facilitated. Such an accomplishment
would be at least as salutary as eliminating the need for one injured
by a nonresident motorist to chase the potential defendant to his
home state in order to secure judicial redress and consequential
economic compensation.-" Providing certainty and appropriate
finality to a judicial determination of divorce and the economic
consequences of that divorce seems as much a desideratum as
sparing the personal injury plaintiff a trip to nonresident defen-
dant's home state. How can it be effected?
The method is simple. The state in which the divorce-action
plaintiff is domiciled should be considered a forum having juris-
diction over the marital status and the economic incidents of
that status. Assuming that the nonresident defendant is given
a form of constructive service reasonably calculated to provide
actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to defend,
the forum's jurisdiction over the status and its economic incidents
should be considered binding upon the defendant. Two immediate
consequences would flow from that formulation of jurisdiction:
(1) the forum's determination of plaintiff's domicile would be
binding upon both parties to the action, and entitled to full
faith and credit, and (2) the forum's determination of alimony
would be binding upon both parties to the action, and entitled
to full faith and credit.
The propriety of such binding effect can be determined fac-
tually by the practical opportunity afforded both litigants for a
full and fair hearing on the two related questions. Perhaps one of
the most frequently heard complaints about "migratory" divorces
is that plaintiff's domicile in the forum state is spurious. The ficti-
tiousness of that domicile is the product of ex parte proceedings.
If only the plaintiff is present to offer evidence on the point, it
is extraordinarily unlikely that that evidence will be seriously con-
troverted. The proceedings are ex parte for one of two reasons.
Either the nonresident defendant is content to have the case
heard and determined by the forum selected by plaintiff, or defen-
dant has been advised that such determination will not be given
binding effect by the courts in defendant's home state or in any
other state. More often than not, when defendant is content to
have the case heard and determined by the forum, that content-
41. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
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ment will be manifested by a formal entry of appearance by de-
fendant. Consequently, the purely ex parte proceeding will be the
result of defendant's having been advised that the forum's deter-
minations of plaintiff's domicile (therefore its jurisdiction) and of
alimony will not be binding upon defendant. Once such advice is
no longer accurate, purely ex parte proceedings can be expected to
be diminished substantially in number. Once the nonresident de-
fendant is precluded legally from assuming a disinterested stance,
the defendant can be expected to appear and to contest vigorously.
That kind of contest necessarily will reduce the likelihood of an
affirmative finding of jurisdiction where plaintiff's domicile is
spurious. Therefore, that supposed evil of "migratory" divorce will
be eliminated. Moreover, the potential plaintiff's expectation of a
vigorous defense would have the effect of dissuading many plain-
tiffs from initiating truly migratory divorce actions. The result
would be a substantially enhanced likelihood that divorce actions
would be initiated only in states in which plaintiffs had established
bona fide domiciles. That likelihood would be further enhanced
by the crucible of contested litigation. Similarly, defendant's active
participation in the divorce action, compelled by knowledge that
the totality of the court's decree would receive full faith and credit,
necessarily would produce alimony orders much more accurately
reflecting the economic capacities and needs of the parties than
such orders entered in ex parte proceedings.
The basic constitutional issue to be resolved in determining
the propriety of such jurisdiction is whether or not it would violate
the due process4 rights of the nonresident defendant. If the issue
were presented tabula rasa, one suspects the answer almost certainly
would be that no such violation would result. After all, both liti-
gants would be afforded the opportunity to litigate fully all rele-
vant issues from domicile through the propriety of granting a di-
vorce decree to the economic consequences of such a decree before
a court presumably competent to hear and determine all such is-
sues. Certainly that negates any suggestion that defendant would be
deprived of liberty or property without due process of law. Yet un-
der existing decisions of the Supreme Court such an assertion of
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant would be deemed vio-
lative of due process. The "rationale" underlying that conclusion
42. "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law..." U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV, § 1.
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was set forth in Hanson v. Denckla. After noting that "the re-
quirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents' have
evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff... to the flexible
standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,"44 the majority
opinion cautioned that
[1]t is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual
demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state
courts....Those restrictions are more than a guarantee of im-
munity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a con-
sequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective
States. However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign
tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he
has had the "minimal contacts" with that state that are a pre-
requisite to its exercise of power over him. See International Shoe
Co. v. Washington ... A5
That quoted language suggests that if a court in State A, the
state of plaintiff's domicile, hears and determines a divorce action
initiated by plaintiff, granting a divorce decree and entering an
order of alimony, the forum will have violated the "territorial
limitations on the power of the respective States" to the extent
that the forum's determinations of jurisdiction and alimony are
afforded binding effect upon the nonresident defendant given con-
structive service. If that is so, State A is effectively precluded from
conclusively determining both the marital status of its own domi-
ciliary and the economic consequences of that status. Moreover, the
state in which the other spouse is domiciled-State B-is likewise
precluded from effecting such conclusive determinations as to i.ts
domiciliary, so long as the State A domiciliary avoids personal
service in State B or declines to enter an appearance in the divorce
proceedings instituted there.
Frankly, the author is unable to comprehend the true signifi-
cance of "territorial limitations on the power of the respective
States." Since each state is a member of the United States and since
the capias ad respondendum has been pass6 for several hundred
years, it isn't entirely clear why-separate and apart from the rigid
strictures of Pennoyer, probably anachronistic when decided-such
"territorial limitations" should exist for jurisdictional purposes.
Who is intended to be protected by the limitations? If the answer
43. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
44. Id. at 251.
45. Id.
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is those not resident in the forum state, the limitations would seem
to exist to protect nonresident defendants from the inconvenience
of foreign litigation. While the inconvenience may be real enough,
in both tangible and intangible respects, it hardly serves as an ade-
quate justification for the limitations, for several reasons.
First, given a potential plaintiff in one state and a potential
defendant in another, if the purported cause of action is ever to be
heard and conclusively determined one of the parties must be sub-
jected to the onus of foreign litigation. Why should it inevitably
and invariably be the plaintiff?46
Second, if the inconvenience imposed on the defendant is
adequately substantial and sufficiently outweighs the incon-
venience which would be imposed on the plaintiff by trial in
another forum-defendant's home state, for example-defendant
possesses the capacity to avoid the undue inconvenience by a
forum non conveniens motion.
Third, the language above excerpted from Hanson explicitly
negates inconvenience imposed on the defendant arising from
foreign litigation as the basic reason for the jurisdictional limi-
tations prescribed. What the language fails to do is provide a per-
suasive alternative reason for the "territorial limitations" imposed.
Indeed, that quoted phrase becomes not only the jurisdictional
conclusion but the sole explanation for the conclusion. As an
explanation, it is painfully inadequate.
Whatever the rationale for the "territorial limitations"
may be, it is clear how those limitations operate in divorce actions.
They effectively strip each of the domicile states of the respective
spouses of the legal capacity to determine conclusively the marital
status and the economic consequences incidental thereto of its own
domiciliary. Unless and until the nonresident spouse is willing to
(1) institute the divorce action in the foreign state in which defen-
dant resides, (2) accept service of process in the foreign state in
a divorce action there instituted by the resident spouse, or (3)
enter a formal appearance in the foreign state in a divorce action
there instituted by the resident spouse, each state can hear and
determine a divorce action instituted by its own domiciliary and
enter an alimony order in such action only with the knowledge
46. See Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 878 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967) (Judge Friendly) ;
Seidelson, jurisdiction Over Nonresident Defendants: Beyond "Minimum Contacts" and the
Long-Arm Statutes, 6 DUQUESNE L. REv. 221 (1968).
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that its alimony order will be ineffective in binding the nonresi-
dent defendant and that its divorce decree will be subject to attack
by the nonresident defendant on the ground that the forum lacked
jurisdiction because plaintiff was not a bona fide domiciliary of
the forum state. Under existing decisions of the Supreme Court,
the ultimate consequence of recognizing the legitimate interest
which each state has in the marital status of its domiciliaries and in
the economic consequences of that status is to preclude every state
from conclusively determining the status and its economic conse-
quences. Surely that is the least desirable jurisdictional conse-
quence of a well founded recognition of the interest which each
state has in its domiciliaries' marital status and incidental economic
integrity. At best, it can be described as a Mexican stand-off-at
worst, a complete frustration of the legitimate interest of each
state in the marital status and economic integrity of its domicili-
aries.
That legitimate interest, complemented by a common sense
reading of the due process clause, leads the author to suggest that
a court in a state in which one of the spouses is domiciled should
be deemed to have jurisdiction over the divorce action and the
economic incidents thereto, so long as the defendant has been given
a form of constructive service reasonably calculated to provide
actual notice of the proceeding and an opportunity to defend, and
such jurisdiction is capable of withstanding a forum non conveniens
motion.
That suggestion, in turn, leads to this question: Should such
jurisdiction be deemed appropriate for a court sitting in a state
other than the domicile of either spouse? To the extent that that
assertion of jurisdiction would do no violence to, and could be
exercised consistently with, the interest of each state in the
marital status of its domiciliary, such jurisdiction would seem
appropriate. To determine whether or not the assertion of such
jurisdiction would be compatible with the legitimate interest
which every state has in its domiciliaries' marital status and the
economic consequences of that status requires an examination
of the law which such a forum would apply in affecting the status
and its economic incidents.
The essence of interest analysis in resolving choice-of-law
problems is that each issue in a case should be resolved by the ap-
plication of the dispositive law of that state having the dominant
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interest in that issue. The technique of achieving that result exists
in the fashioning of indicative laws by the forum which will refer
it to the appropriate dispositive laws. The two central choice-of-
law problems in a divorce action would be which state's law should
determine the grounds available for divorce and which state's law
should determine the availability and amount of permanent ali-
mony.
For the dual purposes of testing the propriety of vesting
jurisdiction in a non-domicile state court and of viewing the choice-
of-law problems from the point of view of a "disinterested" forum,
the following hypothetical case Will be examined: H, a domiciliary
of State A, institutes a divorce action against W, a domiciliary of
State B, in a court in State F. W is given a form of constructive
service consistent with due process. The grounds asserted by H
are indignities to his person41 committed by W in State C. Indig-
nities constitute grounds for divorce in State A; they do not in
States B, C or F. Assuming that the forum asserts jurisdiction, it
will be confronted with this choice-of-law problem: Which state's
law should be looked to in order to determine the legal sufficiency
of the grounds asserted?
The rule is... well established that it is the divorce statute of
the forum which governs the granting of a divorce. This is true
even though all the operative facts occurred in some other state. If
those facts constitute grounds for divorce according to the law of
the forum, the divorce may be granted. If they do not, it may not
be.48
But why the existence of such black-letter law? The answer
lies in part in an early form of interest analysis. Since it was gen-
erally assumed that the divorce-action plaintiff would be domiciled
in the forum, the forum's dispositive law (statutory in this case)
determined the grounds available for a divorce. After all, isn't
that an appropriate manner of reacting to the forum's legitimate
47. A fairly typical legislative enactment of "indignities" as a ground for divorce may
be found in Pennsylvania:
When a marriage has been heretofore or shall hereafter be contracted and
celebrated between two persons, it shall be lawful for the innocent and injured
spouse to obtain a divorce from the bond of matrimony, whenever it shall be judged
... that the other spouse:
(i) Shall have offered such indignities to the person of the injured and innocent
spouse, as to render his or her condition intolerable and life burdensome ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (1929).
48. H. CLAan, Tim LAw oF Doiisnc RME-1IONs IN TIM UNrE STAT=s 327 (1968).
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interest in the marital status of its domiciliary? If, however, the
forum is not within the state of domicile of either litigant, deter-
mining the available grounds for divorce by recourse to the
forum's statutory law would be inconsistent with interest analysis.
To such a disinterested forum, there would seem to be three feasible
alternatives in determining which state's law should determine
the availability of indignities as grounds for a divorce: the state
in which defendant's conduct occurred, the state of plaintiff's
domicile or the state of defendant's domicile.
Fashioning an indicative law which referred the forum to the
dispositive law of the state in which defendant's conduct occurred
would be justified if the forum determined that the principal rea-
son for statutory grounds for divorce was conduct regulation. In
that event, the state having the paramount interest would be the
state where the undesirable activity had taken place. One could
assert that such statutory grounds for divorce exist primarily for
the purpose of dissuading spouses from engaging in conduct'cov-
ered by the statutes. The assertion, however, lacks persuasiveness.
While statutory grounds for divorce may have some such dissuasive
effect, and may even have been intended by the legislature to have
such. an effect, it seems more likely that the dominant legislative
concern in fashioning the grounds for divorce was to determine
in what circumstances a domiciliary of the state should be entitled
to be relieved of the matrimonial status. Presumably each legis-
lature, in enacting the statutory grounds for divorce, was attempt-
ing to describe those situations in which divorce would be appro-
priate for its domiciliaries. Consequently, an indicative law
fashioned by interest analysis would be more likely to refer to the
dispositive law of a domicile state than to the dispositive law of the
state where the defendant's conduct occurred.
That conclusion necessarily raises the next issue for interest
analysis to resolve. Should the forum's indicative law refer to the
dispositive law of plaintiff's domicile or of defendant's domicile?
One could assert that each state has an exactly equal interest
in the issue, since each state has the same legitimate interest in
the marital status of its own domiciliary. Striking an even balance
of interests between the "competing" states is probably the most
distracting and disturbing conclusion which a forum engaged in
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interest analysis can achieve.49 It bears the potential of reducing
that sophisticated method of resolving choice-of-law problems to
a. coin-flip. Happily, it can'be avoided here neatly and legitimately.
Still assuming that each state's statutory grounds for divorce
constitute a legislative manifestation of those circumstances in
which a domiciliary should be able to secure relief and release from
the marital status, the dispositive law of plaintiff's domicile would
seem to be the appropriate law for determining the availability
of any asserted grounds for a divorce. Since the plaintiff is the
spouse particularly intended to be the beneficiary of legislatively
enacted grounds for divorce, he is uniquely within the class of per-
sons intended to be benefited by the statutes. Their principal
purpose is to provide a way out of the marriage. By definition, it
is the plaintiff who is seeking the way out. Therefore, the statutory
grounds for divorce in plaintiff's domicile state should determine
the availability of indignities as grounds for divorce. In the
hypothetical case before the court, plaintiff is domiciled in State A
and that state includes indignities within its statutory divorce
grounds. Consequently, the forum should accept the grounds
asserted.
If defendant should cross-claim for a divorce, the propriety
and availability of the grounds asserted by her should be determined
by reference to the dispositive law of State B, her domicile, for the
same reasons set forth above. In her cross-claim, she is the plaintiff-
equivalent seeking to utilize the way out made available by the
statutes of her domicile state for the benefit of its domiciliaries.
In the plaintiff's action, the availability of defenses raises
another choice-of-law problem. The forum's indicative law might
refer to the dispositive law of plaintiff's domicile or of defendant's
domicile. It could be asserted that defendant's domicile would be
the appropriate choice since that state's law regarding available
defenses was intended to protect the spouse seeking retention of
the marriage. The assertion is troubling for two reasons. First,
once the forum decides to utilize the law of plaintiff's domicile
in determining the availability of grounds for divorce, it may
be compelled to utilize the same state's law in determining the
availability of defenses. For example, in the hypothetical case
before the forum, indignities constitute grounds for divorce
49. Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 573, 267 A.2d 854, 859 (1970) (dissenting
opinion); Seidelson, Comment on Cipolla v. Shaposka, 9 DUQUESNr L. Rnv. 423, 427 (1971).
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in plaintiff's domicile but not in defendant's domicile.
Absent the grounds in defendant's domicile, there may be no
applicable law to utilize in determining available defenses. Second,
and less mechanical, the same reasons which suggested utilization
of the dispositive law of plaintiff's domicile in determining the
availability of grounds for divorce could justify reference to the
dispositive law of plaintiff's domicile in determining the avail-
ability of defenses. Specifically, the forum, in fashioning its indic-
ative law, could determine that, just as State A's statutory grounds
for divorce were enacted primarily to provide a way out of the
marriage for the plaintiff, so too were State A's defenses intended
to provide limits to, or further describe and refine the borders of,
the way out. Therefore, it would seem appropriate for the forum
to utilize State A's defenses as well as its statutory grounds for
divorce.
For similar reasons, assuming that defendant cross-claims for
divorce, the forum should utilize the dispositive law of State B,
defendant's domicile, for the purpose of determining available
defenses as well as available statutory grounds.
If defendant W seeks alimony, the forum will find itself con-
fronted with a new set of choice-of-law problems. Specifically, the
forum will have to determine (1) which state's dispositive law
should determine the availability of permanent alimony gener-
ally,"° (2) which state's dispositive law should be utilized in deter-
mining the amount of permanent alimony,51 and (3) which state's
dispositive law should determine the propriety of permanent ali-
mony if W is found to be the "guilty" party. 2
Rather clearly, both A and B, as the respective domiciles of
H and W, have legitimate interests in each of the above enumer-
ated problems.5 Each has the clear potential of affecting the eco-
nomic integrity of each of the divorce-action litigants. It could be
50. Pennsylvania makes no provision for any permanent alimony unless the defendant
spouse is insane. Hooks v. Hooks, 123 Pa. Super. 507, 187 A. 245 (1936); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23, § 45 (1929).
51. For examples of conflicting state laws as to the determination of the amount of
permanent alimony, see CAL. CIVIL CODE tit. 6 §§ 4800-4806 (West 1969); and N.Y.
Dom. RLELs. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1968).
52. The author's distaste for the requirement of "guilt" in divorce proceedings was
noted in Seidelson, Systematic Marriage Investigation and Counseling in Divorce Cases:
Some Reflections on Its Constitutional Propriety and General Desirability, 36 GEo. WAsH.
L. R v. 60 (1967).
53. See text at supra note 16.
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asserted that those interests are equal, since the concern of one
state over the economic integrity of its domiciliary cannot exceed
the similar concern of another state. Once again, however, that
even balance of interests can be avoided properly by a more prob-
ing analysis of the interest of each state. While a permanent ali-
mony order clearly affects the economic integrity of both payer
and recipient, it may have the potential of affecting one more
than the other. To the payer, it represents a diminution of the
total funds he will have available for his own support. That cer-
tainly constitutes a significant impact pn his economic integrity.
Yet, to the recipient, the alimony order represents a sum necessary
to maintain her. Since her maintenance will depend on the order,
she and her domicile state would seem to have an even more signi-
ficant interest in the availability of permanent alimony than would
the payer and his domicile state. Consequently, in determining
the general availability of permanent alimony, the forum should
fashion an indicative law referring to the dispositive law of the
state of domicile of the potential recipient.
The same reasoning would suggest that in determining the
amount of permanent alimony the domicile state of the recipient
has the paramount interest; therefore, in resolving that choice-of-
law problem, the forum's indicative law should refer to the dis-
positive law of the recipient's domicile. Similarly, the state of the
potential recipient's domicile would appear to have the dominant
interest in determining the propriety of permanent alimony if W
is found to be the "guilty" party. As to that issue, one could assert
that H's domicile acquires an additional interest in determining
if its payer-domiciliary should be required to contribute to the
support of the marital malefactor. Another might assert that the
.tate in which the allegedly wrongful conduct occurred had an
interest in determining the economic sanction to be imposed on
-such conduct as a mode of deterrence and, therefore, conduct
Tegulation. Yet neither of those assertions seems adequate to over-
-come the direct economic interest-of W's domicile state. If alimony
is withheld, it is that state which may be required to support or
•contribute'to the support of its indigent domiciliary. That com-
pelling economic interest on the part of the recipient's domicile
-state should be deemed greater than the interest of the payer's
-domicile state in shielding him from contributing to the support
-of the "malevolent spouse," and certainly greater than the interest
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of the state where W's wrongful conduct occurred in punishing,
and thereby regulating by deterrence, such conduct.
By way of review, these choice-of-law resolutions have been
suggested as appropriate for the disinterested forum hearing a
divorce action:
1. In determining the legal sufficiency of the divorce grounds
asserted, the forum should fashion an indicative law refer-
ring to the dispositive law of plaintiff's domicile.
2. In determining the legal sufficiency of divorce grounds
asserted by defendant in a cross-claim, the forum should
fashion an indicative law referring to the dispositive law
-of defendant's domicile.
3. In determining the legal sufficiency of defenses asserted to
the divorce action, the forum should fashion an indicative
-law referring to the dispositive law of' the domicile of the
party seeking the divorce.
4. In determining the availability of permanent alimony
generally, the forum should fashion an indicative law
referring to the dispositive law of the domicile of tfie
potential recipient.
5. In determining ithe amount of permanent alimony, the
forum should fashion an indicative law referring to the
dispositive law of the domicile of the potential recipient. ,
_6 In determining the propriety of permanent alimony if
the potential recipient is the "guilty" party, the forum
should fashion an indicative law referring to the dispost-
tive law of the domicile of the potential recipient.
It will be noted that, as to each of the choice-of-law problems
considered, that dispositive law to be applied is of the state having
a legitimate interest in the particular issue, and, assuming the
propriety of the conclusions achieved, the state having the most
significant interest in each such issue. The reader will recall that
the forum in the hypothetical case considered was "disinterested,'
in the sense that it was not within the domicile state of either
litigant. It would seem, then, 'that affording divorce jurisdiction
to a court in some state other than the domicile state of ,the
plaintiff does no violence to the legitimate interests which -"the
"competing" ,states- have -in- the various issues involved in-such
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litigation. Interest analysis assures that those interests will be
recognized and analyzed by the forum as a condition precedent
to the fashioning of indicative laws which will refer the forum to
the appropriate dispositive laws. That assurance suggests the pro-
priety of extending to any court jurisdiction to hear and determine
an action for divorce and alimony, so long as the nonresident
defendant is provided a form of constructive service reasonably
calculated to give actual notice of the proceeding and an opportu-
nity to defend, and plaintiff's selection of a forum is able to with-
stand a forum non conveniens motion. The legitimate interests
of the states involved are accorded appropriate protection and
recognition even though the forum is not within the state of
plaintiff's domicile.
Another aspect of the choice-of-law resolutions suggested
should be examined to determine their propriety. What would be
the functional effect of such resolutions, in terms of discouraging
"migratory" divorce actions-using that phrase in its worst sense?
By determining the availability of the grounds for divorce asserted
and defenses thereto by reference to the dispositive law of plain-
tiff's domicile, the forum would discourage the plaintiff from
forum-shopping for that state having the most compatible statu-
tory grounds for divorce. By determining the general availability
of alimony, the amount of alimony and the propriety of alimony
for the "guilty" spouse by reference to the dispositive law of
the domicile of the potential recipient, the forum would discour-
age the plaintiff from forum-shopping for that state having the
most compatible law regarding alimony.
Such interest analysis by the forum, then, would serve two
desirable and related purposes: it would assure appropriate recog-
nition of the legitimate interests of the states involved and it would
dissuade divorce-action plaintiffs from seeking "divorce-haven"
forums. Since both of those purposes would be served through
interest analysis, utilized even by a disinterested forum, the en-
larged jurisdiction suggested earlier in this article seems to be
further justified. That enlarged jurisdiction would do no violence
to the interests of the concerned states and would deter divorce-
action plaintiffs from the most undesirable mode of forum-shop-
ping. Simultaneously, it would eliminate the two most undesirable
consequences of presently existing limitations on divorce jurisdic-
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tion: "divisible divorce" and the lack of certainty and finality of a
divorce decree.
It is suggested that a combination of interest analysis in
divorce actions and an enlarged concept of the divorce-action
jurisdiction available to courts would improve substantially the
existing state of the law regarding divorce litigation. It remains
only for a court to engage in the enterprise.

